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COURT OF UTAH IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, and HON. 
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COTT, JR., two of the Judges thereof 
and CHARLES S. MERRILL, 
Defendants. 
and 
CHARLES S. MERRILL, 
Plaint~!!, 
-vs.-
HAROLD CALDER and SYDNEY 
CALDER, 
Defendants. 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 




THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
COURT OF UTAH IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, and HON. 
A. H. ELLETT and HON. RAY VAN 
COTT, JR., two of the Judges thereof 
and CHARLES. S. MERRILL, 
Defendants. 
and 
CHARLES S. MERRILL, 
Plaint~ff, 
-vs.-
HAROLD CALDER and SYDNEY 
CALDER, 
Defendants. 




Most of the issues involved in the foregoing cases 
are the same. Counsel for the Calders entertained some 
doubt as to whether or not the questions which they wish 
to have determined could properly be raised in one pro-
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ceeding. Thus, the Calders complain because the Court 
below dismissed the Counterclaim which they filed in the 
case brought against them by Merrill. It was feared by 
counsel for the Calders that this Court might deem the 
proper remedy is by appeal to secure a ruling on the 
question of the dismissal of the Counterclaims filed by 
the Calders. If such a view should be entertained and the 
dismissal of the Counterclaims should be held to be a 
final judgment as to such Counterclaims from which 
an appeal could be had, the time for appeal would doubt-
less have elapsed before a ruling could be had on the 
matters raised on the Petition for a Writ. 
In view of this situation, counsel for the parties stip-
ulated that the two proceedings might, with the approval 
of this Court, be consolidated. In conformity with such 
stipulation, this Court ordered that the two cases be con-
solidated. We shall, therefore, on behalf of the Calders, 
argue both proceedings in this Brief. 
The petition for a Writ contains copies of all of the 
documents filed in the Court below, but to avoid confu-
sion, we shall, in this Brief, indicate the places in the 
Record on Appeal where the various documents referred 
to may be found. 
Charles S. Merrill, plaintiff in case No. 8159 and one 
of the defendants in Case No. 8155, brought an action in 
the District Court of Salt Lake County, Utah whereby 
he sought to recover from Harold Calder and Sydney 
Calder, defendants in Case No. 8159 and plaintiffs in Case 
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No. 8155, the sum of $33,000.00 which Merrill had paid on 
a written contract for the purchase of 200 acres of land 
situated in Davis County, Utah. 
One of the grounds upon which Merrill sought to 
recover back the money paid by him to the Calders was 
that the contract of purchase was void because the same 
was uncertain in that it did not contain a particular de-
scription of the land to be sold and therefore not in com-
pliance with that provision of the Statute of Frauds, 
U.C.A. 1953, 25-5-3 which provides: 
"Every contract for the leasing for a longer 
period than one year, or for the sale, of any lands, 
or any interest in lands, shall be void unless the 
contract, or some note or memorandum thereof 
is in writing subscribed by the party by whom 
the lease or sale is to be made, or by his law-
ful agent thereunto authorized in writing." 
The particular description which it is claimed by 
Merrill is fatal to the validity of the contract reads thus: 
"Also additional acreage of the Seller located 
in Section 5, Township 1 North, Range 1 East, 
so that the acreage selected in said Section 5, 
added to the acreage in Section 32 above, will total 
200 acres. However the Buyer must select such 
land in Section 5 in one tract, and the selection 
to be made within sixty days from date." 
The land covered by the contract is situated in Davis 
County, Utah where the Calders reside. (R. 1 to 14) 
To the Complaint filed by Merrill the Calders 
answered and filed Counterclaims and a Motion for a 
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Change of Venue, together with an Affidavit in support 
of the Motion for a Change of Venue. In such Affidavit 
it is averred that the land described in the contract and 
in plaintiff's Complaint is situated in Davis County and 
that the defen.dants are and for more than ten years last 
past have been residents of Davis County, Utah. (R. 5) 
At the time of hearing the Motion for a Change of 
Venue, counsel for Merrill was granted leave to amend 
the Complaint by writing thereon that the statement as 
to the land to be sold being below an irrigation ditch was 
made in Salt L~ke County, Utah. No evidence was of-
fered in support of the clain1 that any representations 
were made by the Calders in Salt Lake County unless the 
mere unverified amendment made to the Complaint may 
be said to be evidence, which we submit it is not. The 
Affidavit of the defendants in support of their Motion 
for a Change of Venue is not contradicted. Hon. A. H. 
Ellett, one of the judges of the District Court of Salt 
Lake County, denied the l\1otion for a Change of Yenue 
from Salt Lake County to Davis County. (R. 7) 
Defendants filed an Amended Answer and Counter-
claim in the cause. (R. 15) There are three Counterclaims 
set out in Calders' pleadings. By the first counterclaim, 
they seek to have the court determine that the contract 
between Merrill and the Calders is valid, in the second 
counterclaim they seek to have the court decide that 
Merrill is not entitled to recover the money he has paid 
on the contract upon the ground that such contract is 
void because of the alleged infinnity in the description of 
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the land, and the third counterclaim is for damages for 
breach of the contract in that Merrill has repudiated the 
same. 
The court below granted the motion to dismiss the 
counterclaim and entered an Order to that effect. (R. 
21) While the Order dismissing the counterclaim is in 
the singular, we have assumed that the Court below dis-
missed all three of the Counterclaims because an three 
were argued and submitted to the court for its decision. 
At the time the Order dismissing the Counterclaim 
was made, there was pending in the Court below and not 
disposed of a Motion to require Merrill to select the land 
which he agreed to select in Section 5. (R. 18) 
It is the contention of the Calders that the Court be-
low was in error in denying the Motion for a Change of 
Venue, in dismissing the Counterclaims set out in Calders 
Amended Answer and Counterclaims and that these 
errors may properly be considered and dispo·sed of in the 
Petition filed herein, which is in the nature of a Petition 
for a Writ of Mandamus and is expressly provided for 
in Rule 65 (b) (2) and (3) of the Utah Rules of Civii 
Procedure, or if it should be determined that such mat-
ters may not properly be determined by reason of the 
petition for such a writ that then the same may be de-
termined on the appeal from the order dismissing the 
counterclaims. 
The Calders rely upon the following points and 
errors for the relief which they seek: 
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POINT ONE 
THAT A WRIT IN THE NATURE OF A WRIT OF MAN-
DAMUS IS A PROPER REMEDY TO RAISE THE MATTERS 
WHICH THE CALDERS SEEK TO HAVE DETERMINED. 
POINT TWO 
THAT IT WAS THE DUTY OF THE COURT BELOW TO 
GRANT THE MOTION FOR A CHANGE OF VENUE FROM 
SALT LAKE COUNTY TO DAVIS COUNTY AND IT WAS 
ERROR OF THE COURT TO REFUSE TO ORDER SAID 
CHANGE. 
POINT THREE 
THAT IT WAS THE DUTY OF THE COURT BELOW 
TO HEAR AND DETERMINE THE COUNTERCLAIMS 
TOUCHING THE VALIDITY OF THE CONTRACT BETWEEN 
THE PLAINTIFF MERRILL AND THE DEFENDANTS 
CALDERS AND THE COUNTERCLAIM FOR DAMAGES SUS-
TAINED BY THE CALDERS BY REASON OF PLAINTIFF 
MERRILL HAVING REPUDIATED SUCH CONTRACT, AND 
THAT THE COURT BELOW EXCEEDED ITS JURISDICTION 
AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DISMISSING SUCH 
COUNTERCLAIMS, OR IN ANY EVENT IT WAS ERROR 
TO DISMISS THE COUNTERCLAIMS. 
POINT FOUR 
THAT IT WAS THE DUTY OF THE COURT BELOW TO 
DECIDE THAT MERRILL IS NOT ENTITLED TO 
RECOVER THE MONEY WHICH HE HAS PAID ON THE 
CONTRACT HERE INVOLVED ON ACCOUNT OF ANY IN-
FIRMITY IN THE DESCRIPTION OF THE PROPERTY 
MENTIONED IN THE CONTRACT AND THE COURT BE-
LOW FAILED TO PERFORM A DUTY IMPOSED UPON IT 
WHEN IT FAILED TO SO DECIDE AND ON THE CON-
TRARY IN ANY EVENT THE COURT ERRED IN DISMISS-
ING SUCH COUNTERCLAIMS. 
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A WRIT IN THE NATURE OF A WRIT OF MANDAMUS 
IS A PROPER REMEDY TO RAISE THE MATTERS WHICH 
THE CALDERS SEEK TO HAVE DETERMINED, OR IF NOT 
SUCH MATTERS MAY PROPERLY BE INQUIRED INTO 
BY APPEAL. 
The Calders seek the writ prayed for pursuant to 
65 B (2) and (3) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Such rule, in effect, provides for the same remedy that 
was provided for by the Writs of Mandamus and Certi-
orari as known at common law and by our Code of Civil 
Procedure prior to · the adoption of the Rules of Civil 
Procedure by this court. It will be noted that the Note to 
the rule so indicates. This court has held that: 
"When a District Court erroneously refuses 
to grant a change of venue, mandamus is the prop-
er remedy to compel the granting of such change." 
Hale v. Barker, 70 Utah 284; 259 Pac. 928; Pace v. Wolfe, 
76 Utah 368; 289 Pac. 1102; Schramm Johnson Drug Co. 
v. Cox, 79 Utah 276, 284; 9 Pac. (2d) 399. So also is this 
court committed to the doctrine that where a court erron-
eously dismisses an action or counterclaim, mandamus 
may be resorted to for the purpose of securing the rein-
statement of the dismissed action or counterclaim. State 
v. Second District Court, 36 Utah 396; 104 Pac. 282; 
Ketchum Coal Co. v. District Court of Carbon County, 
48 Utah 342, 359; 159 Pac. 737; 4 A.L.R. 519; Hanson v. 
Iverson, 61 Utah 172; 211 Pac. 682; Harris v. Barker, 80 
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Utah 21, 26; 12 Pac. (2d) 577; Skeen v. Pratt, 87 U. 121; 
48 Pac. (2d) 457; Sta,te v. Hart, 19 Utah 438; 57 Pac. 415; 
State v. Hart, 26 Utah 229; 72 Pac. 938; White v. District 
Court, 232 Pac. (2d) 785, not in Utah reports. 
POINT TWO 
IT WAS THE DUTY OF THE COURT BELOW TO 
GRANT THE MOTION FOR A CHANGE OF VENUE FROM 
SALT LAKE COUNTY TO DAVIS COUNTY AND IT WAS 
ERROR OF THE COURT TO REFUSE TO ORDER SAID 
CHANGE. 
It is provided by Rule 82 of the Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure that: 
"These rules shall not be construed to extend 
or limit the jurisdiction of the Courts of this state 
or the venue of the actions therein." 
It thus follows that the Utah Code of Civil Procedure 
is still in effect and is controlling. 
U.C.A. 1953, 78-13-1 provides: 
"Actions for the following causes must be 
tried in the county in which the subject of the ac-
tion, or some part thereof is situated, subject to 
the power of the court to change the place of trial 
as provided in this code (1) For the recovery of 
real property, or of an estate or interest therein, 
or for the determination in any form of such right 
or interest, and for injuries to real property. (2) 
For the partition of real property. (3) For the 
foreclosure of all liens and mortgages on real 
property. 
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Where the real property is situated partly 
in one county and partly in another, the plaintiff 
may select either of the counties and the county so 
selected is the proper county for the trial of such 
action." 
U.C.A. 1953, 78-13-4: 
"Where the defendant has contracted in writ-
ing to perform an obligation in a particular county 
of the state and resides in another county, an ac-
tion on such contract obligation may be com-
menced and tried in the county where such obliga-
tion is to be performed or in which the defendant 
resides." 
U.C.A. 1953, 78-13-5 and 78-13-6 deals with transitory 
causes of action arising without the state and as the 
cause of action here involved did not arise without the 
state, the foregoing sections dealing with transitory ac-
tions have no application here. U.C.A. 1953, 78-13-7 pro-
vides that: 
"In all other cases the action must be tried in 
the county in which the cause of action arises, or 
in the county in which any defendant resides at 
the commencement of the action, etc." 
The cause of action here involved falls within the 
provisions of U.C.A. 1953, 78-13-1. It is an action respect-
ing real property. It is for the determination of what 
right or interest the parties have in real estate in Davis 
County by reason of the written contract entered into 
by them on February 28, 1953. Mr. Merrill seeks to have 
the Court hold that he does not have and never has had 
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any interest or right in the real estate described in the 
contract. The Calders contend that Merrill does have 
such an interest and that he is, by the contract, obligated 
to pay the balance of the purchase price. While we have 
been unable to find a case in this jurisdiction where the 
exact question here presented has been decided, :.we do 
find cases where this Court has announced principles of 
law that are applicable to the facts here involved. 
In the case of Buckle v. Ogden Fu.rnitu.re arnd Carpet 
Co., 61 Utah 559; 216 Pac. 684, it is held that it was the 
intention of the legislature in enacting the law as to 
venue of actions to establish the right of a defendant in 
an action to have an action against him tried in the 
county where he or a co-defendant resides and tha~ 
actions which may be tried elsewhere are limited and 
restricted to those which the act itself exempts from the 
general rule. Under this section an action to foreclose 
mining claims is properly brought in the county where 
the claim is situated. Field v. Daisy Gold Mining Co., 26 
Utah 373; 73 Pac. 521. Where a note secured by a mort-
gage is payable in one county and the property is in 
another, the foreclosure is properly had in the county 
where the mortgaged property, or some part thereof, is 
situated. Sherman v. Droubay, 27 Utah 47; 74 Pac. 348. 
To the same effect are: Conant v. Deep Creek and C. 
Valley Irr. Co., 23 Utah 627; 66 Pac. 188; 90 An1. St. 
Rep. 721; First Nat'l. Bank of Coalville v. Boley, 90 Utah 
341; 346; 61 Pac. (2d) 621; Boley c. District Court of 2nd 
Judicial DiJ.strict in and forM organ County, 90 Utah 347; 
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61 Pac. (2d) 624. In the case of Barber v. Anderson, 73 
Utah 357; 274 Pac. 136, it is held that the proper county 
to bring an action to set aside a Deed is the County 
where the property is situated. 
Our statutory law dealing with the venue of actions 
touching actions affecting real estate is in accord with 
the common law dealing with the same question. It is so 
stated in the case of Field v. Daisy Gold Min. Co., supra. 
Common law actions affecting interest in real estate were 
local in their nature and therefore should be brought in 
the county where the land is located, while transitory 
actions could be brought where the cause of action arose 
or where one or more of the defendants reside. It is 
said in 56 Am. J'ur ., page 13, Sec. 11 that: 
"Venue statutes providing that suits for the 
possession or recovery of real estate, or for the 
determination of title, rights and interest in real 
estate are to be brought in the county where the 
real estate or some part thereof is situated are 
more or less declaratory of common-law rules and 
the common-law tests of local action are usually 
applied." 
Quoting further from page 14 of the above Vol. of Am. 
J ur., it is said: 
"A statute which makes local actions for the 
determination of interest in lands has been held 
applicable to an action for the reformation of a 
contract for the sale of land, a proceeding to set 
aside a transfer of real estate as in fraud of 
creditors, a suit to have a deed absolute on its 
face declared a mortgage and to redeem there-
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12 
from, an action to quiet title to real estate as 
against the apparent lien of a void judgment, ~nd 
a suit against an executor and devisees to subJect 
real estate to the payment of debts of the ancestor 
and to vacate deeds made by the devisees to third 
persons." 
Cases are cited in the foot notes which support the law 
announced in that text. As heretofore stated there would 
seem to be no escape from the conclusion that the deter-
mination of whether or not the contract between Merrill 
and the Calders is valid or invalid is local in character 
in that it involves "the determination" of a ''right or 
interest" ... to real propery \vithin the meaning of 
U.C.A. 1953, 78-13-1. 
Moreover U.C.A. 1953, 78-13-4 provides that an 
action on written contracts must be had either in the 
county where the defendant resides or where the obliga-
tion by its terms is to be performed. In this case the 
defendants reside in Davis County and the contract by 
its terms is to be performed in Davis County. 
This Court on a nrunber of occasions has construed 
such Section as meaning that an action on a written con-
tract must be brought in the County where the defendant 
or some of them reside or· if the contract is to be per-
formed in a county other than that where the defendant 
or some of them reside, then and only in such case may 
the action be commenced in the county where the contract 
is by its terms to be performed. Bnckle L Ogden Furni-
ture and Carpet Co., 61 U. 559; 216 Pac. 684; Palfrey'man 
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v. Truema,n, 105 Utah 463; 142 Pac. 677, 678; Atlas 
Acceptance Corp. v. District Judge, 85 Utah 352, 39 Pac. 
2d 710; Floor v. Mitchell, 86 Utah 203; 41 Pac. (2d) 281; 
Simmons v. Hoyt, 109 Utah 186; 167 Pac. (2d) 27. 
Apparently the trial court took the view that the 
venue of this action is controlled by U.C.A. 1953, 78-13-7. 
It will be seen that the provisions of that Section apply 
only to actions not covered by the other provisions. 
There are such cases as Schramm Johrnson Drug Co. v. 
Cox, 79 Utah 276, 283; 9 Pac. (2d) 399, and the Deseret 
Irrigation Company v. Mcintyre, 16 Utah 398; 52 Pac. 
628, which are authority for the doctrine that if a cause 
of action arises in two or more counties, the same may 
be brought in either county. However, it must be a transi-
tory action and not an action respecting real property or 
a written contract, because the venue of such actions is 
fixed by U.C.A. 1953, 78-13-1 and 78-13-4. 
There is still another reason why the Court below 
erred in failing to order a change of venue from Salt 
Lake to Davis County, namely, the affidavit by the 
Calders shows that they are residents of Davis County 
and that the land in question is located in such county. 
Indeed the court will take judicial notice of the fact that 
the land is located in Davis County, Utah. There is no 
competent evidence which shows or tends to show that 
the Calders ever made any false or other representations 
in Salt Lake County. It does appear that at the hearing 
of the Motion for a Change of Venue counsel for Merrill 
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asked and was granted leave to amend the allegations 
with respect to false representation as having been made 
in Salt Lake County, Utah. Obviously such unverified 
allegations in a complaint merely signed by counsel for 
Merrill are not evidence of the fact that false representa-
tions were made in Salt Lake County, or for that matter 
anywhere else, especially when the same are denied by 
the Calders. 
Because of the foregoing reasons, the proper venue 
of the action brought by Merrill against the Calders 
above mentioned is in Davis County, and the Calders urge 
that the defendant, District Court and .A. H. Ellett, one 
of the Judges thereof, be commanded to order such 
change of venue to be made. 
POINT THREE 
THAT IT WAS THE DUTY OF THE COURT BELOW 
TO HEAR AND DETERMINE THE COUNTERCLAIMS 
TOUCHING THE VALIDITY OF THE CONTRACT BETWEEN 
THE MERRILL AND THE CALDERS AND THE COUNTER-
CLAIM FOR DAMAGES SUSTAINED BY THE CALDERS 
BY REASON OF MERRILL HAVING REPUDIATED SUCH 
CONTRACT, AND THAT THE COURT BELOW EX·CEEDED 
ITS JURISDICTION AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN 
DISMISSING SUCH COUNTERCLAIMS, OR IN ANY EVENT 
IT WAS ERROR TO DISMISS THE COUNTERCLAIMS. 
By their amended answer and counterclaims the 
Calders in the action brought against them by ~ferrill by 
counterclaims one and three seek to have the Court deter-
mine that the contract with Merrill is not invalid because 
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of the description of the land or that if such relief may 
not be had that the Calders be awarded damages on 
account of the repudiation of the contract by Merrill. 
While the authorities generally require more con-
vincing evidence to support a decree for specific preform-
ance than is necessary to maintain a judgment for 
damages (See 81 C.J.S., Sec. 6, page 417 and Pomeroy's 
Equity 3rd Ed. Sec. 860, page 1516) the principles of 
law, in each of such proceedings in the main, are the 
same and therefore we shall discuss the first and third 
counterclaims set out in Calders' Answer and Counter-
claim under one heading. 
When the Court below dismissed the Counterclaims 
of the Calders, such dismissal constituted a final adjudi-
cation from which an appeal may be had. Because of 
such a situation, the Calders are seeking relief by a 
petition for a Writ and also by appeal so that if this 
court should deem a proceeding in the nature of manda-
mus improper, this court is vested with authority to 
pass upon the rulings complained of by the Calders by 
reason of their appeal from the judgment of dismissal. 
However, if the counterclaims were improperly dismissed, 
it is the contention of the Calders herein that such err:or 
may also properly be inquired into and determined by a 
Writ. 
At the hearing of this case in the court below, coun-
sel for Mr. M'errill placed considerable reliance on the 
case of Reed v. Lowe, 8 Utah 39; 29 Pac. 740, which was 
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decided in 1892. It is very doubtful if that case is of any 
value as applied to the facts in this case. The contract in 
that case is set out in full in the opinion. Nothing what-
soever is said in the contract as to who should make the 
selection of the land. That being so, it of necessity 
required oral testimony to determine who should make 
the selection. True the court said that the purchaser had 
the option to make the selection. Evidently such con-
clusion must have been reached because of some oral 
testimony received at the hearing before the referee be-
cause there is no language in the contract to support 
that conclusion. So, also, it cannot be determined from 
the opinion whether the action was brought by the suc-
cessor to the original purchaser or seller. There is no 
language in that contract that either the vendor or the 
vendee obligated himself to make the selection. In this 
cas'e it is expressly provided in the contract that the 
vendee, Merrill, must select such land in Section 5 in one 
tract and the selection to be made within sixty days. 
It was argued in the Court below that Merrill hav-
ing failed to make the selection within the period of sixty 
days, he is by reason of such fact relieved from his 
obligation to make the selection. In other words, Merrill 
may take advantage of his expressed obligation to select 
the land in Section 5 and by that means render invalid 
a contract which would have been valid if he had ful-
filled his obligations. We have always understood the 
law to be that one may not take advantage of his own 
fault. That such is the law is so elementary and of such 
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unifor1n application that the citation of authorities would 
seem unnecessary. If authorities are desired, see Brown 
Legal Maxims, page 156, et seq. 
Nor rnay it be said that there is any uncertainty 
about the contract obligating Merrill to select enough 
land in one piece in Section 5 to make up the 200 acres. 
It is so provided in the contract. The whole contract is 
in writing. Unlike the cases cited and relied upon by 
~[errill, there is no need to rely upon oral evidence to 
ascertain exactly what the parties obligate themselves to 
do. By the terms of the contract, :Jfr. :Merrill is to select 
the land he needs to make up the 200 acres in Section 5 
within sixty days from the date of the contract. 
It should be noted that courts of equity in proper 
cases enforce the specific performance of contracts to 
perform acts other than the conveyance of land. The 
test applied by courts of equity is whether or not an 
action at law affords adequate relief. 
It is true that contracts for personal service extend-
ing over a long period or which require the performance 
of a series of acts or which vest a descretion in the per-
son obligated to perform a particular act will generally 
not be specifically enforced by a court of equity because 
to do so is usually burdensome and often impossible to 
enforce. However, courts of equity do not hesitate to 
grant specific performance of contracts to perform serv-
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ices or acts which such person has agreed to perform 
when a decree of specific performance may readily and 
effectively be enforced. 
The law in such particular is thus stated in 49 Am. 
Jur. 22: 
"Jurisdiction to decree specific performance 
of a contract is exercised in two classes of cases: 
(1) Where the subject matter of the contract is 
of such special nature or of such peculiar value 
that damages, when ascertained according to legal 
rules, would not be a just and reasonable substi-
tute for or representative of that subject matter 
in the hands of the party entitled to its benefits, 
in other words, when damages are inadequate. 
(2) Where from special and practical features or 
incidents of the contract inhering in the subject 
matter, in its terms, or in the relation of the 
parties, it is impossible to arrive at a legal mea-
sure of damages at all, or at least with any degree 
of certainity so that no real compensation can be 
obtained by means of an action at law, in other-
words, where dan1ages are impracticable." 
'l1o the same effect see Pomeroy's Specific Perfonnance 
of Contracts, Sec. 22 and 24, pages 59 et seq. and 75 et 
seq. and cases cited in foot. notes. 
We quote the following fron1 ·the section just cited: 
"As a general proposition, contracts which 
provide for the personal affirmative acts, or 
personal service of the parties, are not specifically 
enforced in equity, not because the legal re1nedy 
of damages is always sufficiently certain and 
adequate, but because the courts do not possess 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
19 
the means and ability of enforcing their decrees, 
which would necessarily be very special and of 
compelling the performance, which constitutes the 
equitable remedy. Wherever from the nature of 
the agreement the difficulty in the way of grant-
ing relief does not exist or can be obviated, the 
principles and rules of specific performance apply 
to contracts which stipulate for personal acts or 
omissions, as well as to those whose subject mat-
ter is real or personal property. A few examples 
of such application will suffice as illustrations. 
Agreements for a separation between husband and 
wife, if valid in form, made upon a sufficient con-
sideration and executed by parties legally able 
to contract, will be specifically enforced by de-
creeing the execution and delivery of the proper 
deed, and by restraining the husband, if necessary, 
from personally interfering with and molesting 
his wife in violation of his covenant. 
''A third class consists of contracts concern-
ing a subject matter which would admit a suf-
ficient remedy in damages, but which are so 
connected with circumstances and incidents, or 
are so incomplete in their terms, that a common 
law action upon them cannot perhaps be main-
tained, and which, nevertheless, equity considers 
as binding and enforcing by its own remedy of 
specific performance. 
"The following are instances: An agreement 
for the purchase of timber was not the final con-
tract in form between the parties but was to be 
made complete by subsequent writings. The 
remedy for the breach, by an action at law, being 
doubtful, on account of this incompleteness, the 
Court of chancery decreed its execution." 
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It will be seen frmn the last citation of P01neroy, 
page 75, that in some cases the court of equity will, in 
the event mandamus is impracticable, use its injunctive 
powers to accomplish the desired result. 
In the Court below reliance was had by counsel for 
Merrill on the Statute of Frauds to support the motion 
to dismiss the counterclaim. The contract here brought 
in question meets both the letter and the spirit of the 
Statute of Frauds. The contract is in writing subscribed 
by the party by whom the sale is to be made and also by 
the person who is to purchase the property. 
It is provided by the contract: 
"That the seller, Calders, for the considera-
tion herein mentioned agrees to sell and convey 
to the buyer, and the buyer for the consideration 
herein mentioned agrees to purchase the follow-
ing described property situated in the County of 
Davis, State of Utah ... also additional acreage 
of the Seller located in Section 5, Tmvnship 1 
North, Range 1 East, so that the acreage selected 
in said Section 5 added to the acreage in Section 
32 above will total 200 acres. However, the 
Buyer must select such lands in Section 5 in one 
tract and the selection to be made within sixty 
days from date." 
It is familiar doctrine that the purpose of the Statute 
of Frauds is to prevent fraud not to aid in its accomplish-
ment. Its purpose is thus expressed in P01neroy Specifi~ 
Performance of Contracts, page 183, Sec. 71 as follows: 
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"The primary object to be obtained by the 
statute of frauds, as the term implies, is to pre-
vent mistakes, frauds and perjuries, by substi-
tuting written for oral evidence in the most impor-
tant classes of contracts, the courts of equity 
have established the principle which they apply 
under various circumstances, that it shall not he 
used as an instrument for the accomplishment of 
fraudulent purposes; designed to prevent fraud, 
it shall not be permitted to work frauds." 
Quoting further from the same book, Sec. 85, page 206, 
it is said: 
"The mmnorandum, whether consisting of one 
writing or of several, must contain all the essen-
tial terms of the agreement so stated, that while 
parol evidence Inay, perhaps be resorted to for 
purposes of identification and to explain the situ-
ation of the parties and o.f the subject matter, it 
shall not be required to supply any substantive 
features which have been omitted. While the 
memorandum must thus embrace the substance of 
the contract, it need not describe the terms in a 
complete and detached manner; it is enough tha;t 
what the parties have really assented to can be 
gathered from the writing and is not left to the 
recollection of witnesses. When this requirement 
is complied with, the demands of the statute are 
satisfied, however brief and informal the docu-
ment may be." 
Applying the principles of law above quoted to the 
case in hand, the written contract clearly provides what 
the seller and buyers are required to do. There is no 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
22 
opportunity to misunderstand its meaning, nor to make 
a contract other than the one agreed to by the parties 
who signed the same. 
If and when Merrill selects the property which he 
agrees to select and which a court of equity may require 
him to select, then and in such case the description of the 
property which forms the subject matter of this contract 
is certain. If the contract were silent as to who should 
make the selection or when the same was to be made, 
then and in such case there might be merit to the claim 
that the whole of the contract is not in writing. But that 
is not this case. The Buyer by his contract agre·es to 
make the selection within sixty days from the date of 
tlie contract. Such obligation on the part of Merrill, the 
buyer, is in effect a power of attorney, coupled with an 
interest. That being so, the Calders could not revoke 
such power, nor would the smne have terminated upon 
the death of the Calders. So also does the language make 
it mandatory for Merrill to exercise the power. That 
being so a court of equity will require that the power 
should be exercised. See 72 C.J.S. p. 406-408, Sec. 8-10. 
To the same effect see -t-1 An1. J ur. p. 806-808, Sec. :2, 3, 
4 and 5. Cases are collected in foot notes which support 
the text. 
If we take a further look at the purpose of the 
Statute of Frauds, it will be seen that 1\fr. l\Ierrill is 
without any standing in a court of equity to 1naintain a 
right to be relieved of his obligations to perforn1 his 
obligations under the contract here brought in question. 
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As will be seen from the foregoing citation, the courts 
are uniform in holding that the Statutes of F'rauds are 
enacted to prevent fraud or as is often said to serve as 
a shield, not as a sword. 
If as the contract provides Merrill may select in 
one piece any tract of land in Section 5, he could not be 
injured because the particular tract is not 1nore definitely 
described. Indeed it is apparent that such provision 
cannot possibly be used to defraud Merrill, but on the 
contrary is calculated to confer upon him a distinct bene-
fit. Under the expressed terms of the contract, the 
Calders are bound by any selection of the lands in Sec-
tion 5 that _jlen·ill may make because they have so agreed 
in writing. There is, as the statute provides, not only 
a note or memorandun1 thereof in writing, but an exe-
cuted contract in writing wherein the Calders agree to 
make the conveyance upon Merrill making the selection 
which he in turn agrees to make. Where the language is 
similar to that contained in the contract here involved, 
the adjudicated cases quite generally support the views 
heretofore contended for. 
In 49 Am. J ur., 660, Sec. 350, it is said "that there is 
a definite conflict in the results of the cases determining 
the sufficiency under the Statute of Frauds of a descrip-
tion in a land contract which gives one of the parties 
the right to select the particular tract to be conveyed, but 
the diversity in result appears to be due in part at least 
to the circumstances present in some cases, but absent 
from others that the description located the property 
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from which the tract to be conveyed was to be selected," 
etc. We have exmnined the cases cited in the· foot notes 
and from such examination, it is quite apparent that the 
results reached in the main depends on the language used. 
Thus in such cases as Fleishm(]Jfb v. Wood, 135 Cal. 256; 
67 Pac. 276, the court holds that where, as here, the 
plaintiff is granted a right to make the selection, there 
is a compliance with the Statute of Frauds in that the 
entire contract is in writing. 
The basis for such holding is thus expressed in the 
case of DeRemer v. Anderson, 169 Pac. 737; 41 Nev. 287; 
25 A.L.R. 775, page 740 of the Pacific Reporter: 
"This contract made the basis of the cross-
complaint was entered into between the plaintiff, 
Fleishman and a third party and provided that 
upon the third party's performing certain condi-
tions, he should at the end of three years become 
entitled to a conveyance of 4:Y2 acres of the west 
half of said ten acres to be selected by the zJ!nin-
tiff. The Court in dealing with the specific ques-
tion said: 
There is no uncertainity as to the 1nanner in 
which the selection is required to be 1nade, nor 
do we see any lack of power in a court of equity 
to compel the selection to be n1ade." 
It will be noted that by the cross-c01nplaint in that 
case, the defendant sought to compel the plaintiff to do 
that which by his contract he had agreed to do, namely 
to select the nu1nber of acres designated. In the n1atter 
at bar, the party to make the selection is unnamed and 
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unindicated. Were the terms and conditions of the con-
tract between the parties here at all analogous to those 
in the Fleishman Wood case, we would have no hesitancy 
in concurring in the rule there asserted. 
Among the cases supporting the view here contended 
for is Peckham v. Lane, 81 Kan. 489; 106 Pac. 464 decided 
in 1910. In that case it was contended that the contract 
there involved was unenforcable where a part of a larger 
tract of land should be selected by the defendant out of 
the larger tract of land owned by them because of the 
Statute of Frauds. Beginning at the bottom of page 465, 
of the Pacific Reporter, it is said: 
"This view makes it necessary to determine 
\Vhether, under the statute of frauds, an action 
will lie to compel the performance of a written 
contract for the sale of a tract of land to be 
selected out of a larger tract by the person sought 
to be charged; the selection not having been made 
in writing. Alabama Mineral Land Co. v. Jack-
son, 121 Ala. 172, 25 South. 709, 77 Am. St. Rep. 
46, seems to answer this question in the negative. 
We think that case, however, proceeds upon a 
misconception. No reason is apparent why a per-
son may not make a valid contract that he will 
sell to another one of several pieces of real estate 
of which he is the owner, to be selected by himself. 
When an agreement to that effect is written out 
and signed, it is a complete contract, all of the 
terms of which are expressed in writing. The 
owner agrees that he will first make the selection 
and then make the conveyance. If he refuses to 
do either, a court may compel him to do both. If 
he makes the selection and then refuses to con-
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vey the court may coerce the completion of the 
contract. Probably an oral selection would not be 
enough to convert the contract into one for the 
conveyance of the specific tract selected. If the 
buyer should claim, over the denial of the owner, 
that the latter had made a selection, and upon 
that ground demand the conveyance of a particu-
lar tract, doubtless he could not support his con-
tention except by written evidence, for to permit 
oral testimony to settle such dispute would be 
against the purpose of the statute. But he cannot 
avoid the obligation to which he has cmnmitted 
himself in writing, merely by refusing to act at 
all. This seems so obvious that the citation of 
the authorities is hardly necessary. The principle, 
however, is illustrated with 1nore or less fullness 
in the following cases: Ellis v. Burden, 1 Ala. 
458, 466; Carpenter v. Lockhard, 1 Ind. -134; 
Washburn et al v. Fletcher, 42 Wis. 152; Fleish-
man v. Woods, 135 Cal. 256, 67 Pac. 276." Waters 
v. Ben Extrix (N.J.) 29 AT1590. 
The learned author of Page on Contracts, Vol. 6, page 
5785, cites with approval the foregoing case and states 
the law to be as therein announced. 
It will be noted in that case it was the vendor that 
was to make the selection and the Court held that he 
should be compelled to make the selection in an action 
for specific performance. 
In the case of Dohan.ey v. Womack, Texas, 1893, 20 
S.W. 950, it is held that \\'here a person was sold 100 
acres out of an 825 acre tract with the privilege of select-
ing which 100 acres he wants, the vendee beca1ne a tenant 
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in com1non with the vendor in 100/825 of the tract until 
he makes his selection, and the deed is not void for uncer-
tainty. Other cases there cited to the same effect are: 
Wallace v. Miller, 52 Calif. 655; Lawrence v. Ballou, 37 
Cal. 518; Schenk v. Evoy, 24 Cal. 410; Brown v. Bailey, 
1 Mete. (Mass.) 254. 
In the case of Rains v. Apking, 247 S.W. (2d) 263, 
it is held that a deed conveying a house and two acres 
around the house to be surveyed and laid off and desig-
nated by grantees, when the parties could not agree on 
the location of the two acres, the court appointed com-
missioners to lay off the land and such ruling was 
affirmed. 
In 117 A.L.R. page 1086, the law is thus stated: 
"Under the authorities generally it is clear 
that a deed is not void which purports to convey 
out a larger track of land presumably owned by 
the grantor, a stated number of unlocated acres 
to be selected at the will of the grantee." 
It will be noted tha:t numerous cases are there cited 
in support of the law above quoted. See also Schmalzer 
v. Ja.mnik et al, (Ill.) 95 N.E. (2d) 347 (1950). 
The cases we have heretofore discussed are typical 
of the cases generally which hold that under facts similar 
to the facts in this case specific performance will be 
ordered or damages will be awarded in case of a breach. 
Doubtless the court will not desire to read the numerous 
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cases dealing with the subject and therefore we have 
directed its attention to only a few cases which will enable 
the court to ascertain the trend of judicial authority. 
POINT FOUR 
THAT IT WAS THE DUTY OF THE COURT BELOW TO 
DECIDE THAT MERRILL IS NOT ENTITLED TO 
RECOVER THE MONEY WHICH HE HAS PAID ON THE 
CONTRACT HERE INVOLVED ON ACCOUNT OF ANY IN-
FIRMITY IN THE DESCRIPTION OF THE PROPERTY 
MENTIONED IN THE CONTRA·CT, AND THE COURT BE-
LOW FAILED TO PERFORM A DUTY IMPOSED UPON IT 
WHEN IT FAILED TO SO DECIDE AND ON THE CON-
TRARY ERRED IN DISMISSING THE COUNTERCLAIMS. 
It will be noted that the Court below dis1nissed the 
counterclaim. It does not appear which counterclaim is 
meant. However, counsel for l\Ierrill argued that the 
counterclain1 with respect to :Merrill not being entitled 
in any event to the return of the down payment should 
be stricken because that question Inight properly be 
raised on the general issue. 
No such basis for dis1nissing the counterclain1 is set 
out in the motion, and therefore, the record shows that 
the amended counterclain1 was dis1nissed as recited in 
the motion "because the san1e does not state facts suf-
ficient upon which to constitute a clain1 against the 
plaintiff. 
Moreover, it is a well established rule of equitable 
jurisdiction that when equity takes jurisdiction of a con-
troversy, it will decide every other contention connected 
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with the subject matter of the suit. The law in such 
particular is thus stated in 49 Am. Jur. page 192, Sec. 
170: 
"The general rule that equity, having taken 
jurisdiction of a cause, will retain jurisdiction of 
the litigation and grant full relief is applied to 
actions for specific performance. Where a court 
of equity properly acquires jurisdiction of a cause 
for specific perfonnance, it may go on to com-
plete adjudication of all 1natters properly pre-
sented and involved in the case, even to the extent 
of adjudicating legal rights and granting legal 
remedies, as well as granting all appropriate 
equitable relief. Once the jurisdiction of equity 
has attached, it will itself proceed to round out 
the whole circle of the controversy, and decide 
every other contention connected with the sub-
ject matter of the suit essential to do complete 
justice. Damages may be awarded in a proper 
case either independently or in addition to a 
decree of specific performance. Even though 
specific performance is denied, the court may 
in a proper case retain the bill and adjudicate and 
adjust any other equities which have arisen 
between the parties." 
In this case l\Ierrill seeks a rescission of the contract 
which is an equitable proceeding and the Calders seek a 
construction of the contract to the effect that the same 
is legal and enforceable or if not enforceable that the 
Calders are entitled to retain the money paid on the 
contract. That being the nature of this proceeding on 
behalf of both :Merrill and the Calders, the courts will 
dispose of all such issues, and not require· the same to 
be again litigated. 
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The law touching the question of the right of a party 
to recover back money paid on a contract such as that 
here involved is thus stated in 49 Am. J'ur., page 870, 
Sec. 564: 
"Where Yendor is Ready and Willing to Per-
form.-According to the great weight of authority, 
the vendee, under an agreement for the sale and 
purchase of land which does not satisfy the statute 
of frauds, cannot recover back payments upon 
the purchase price if the vendor has not repudi-
ated the contract but is ready, willing, and able 
to perform in accordance therewith, even though 
the contract is not enforceable against the vendee 
either at law or in equity. lT nder this rule, one 
who has paid money in consideration of an oral 
contract cannot rescind such contract and recover 
the money paid unless the other party insists 
upon the statute and refuses to perforn1 it on his 
part. It is necessary for the vendee to shmr 
tender of compliance on his part and a refusal 
of c01npliance on the part of the vendor. This is 
held true as to payments Inade to a third person 
for the benefit of the vendor, to be paid over to 
him upon his making the conveyance. It has 
been said that the purpose of the statute, so far 
as it relates to the sale of land, is to protect the 
vendor only, and the vendee, seeking to recover 
purchase money, cannot set up the statute against 
a vendor who is ready and willing to perforn1. The 
contract cannot be considered void so long as he 
for the protection of whose rights the statute is 
made is willing to treat and consider the contract 
good. 
"In a few jurisdictions, the vendee is allowed 
to recover back payments made on the purchase 
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price under a contract which does not satisfy the 
sta:tute of frauds, notwithstanding the vendor is 
ready, able, and willing to perform, unless there 
has been such part performance by possession or 
otherwise as would take the contract out of the 
statute and enable the vendee to enforce it in 
equity against the vendor. It is to be observed 
that in most of the jurisdictions which follow the 
latter view allowing recovery of payments made, 
notwithstanding the readiness, ability, or willing-
ness of the vendor to perform, the statute, unlike 
the form of Sec. 4 of the original statute of frauds 
( 29 Car II, c 3), declared the oral contract void, 
whereas in most of the jurisdictions following the 
general rule denying recovery, the statute merely 
declared that no action should be brought upon 
the oral contract. In some jurisdictions, however, 
notwithstanding the statute declares that oral 
contracts shall not be valid, the courts adhere to 
the rule that the vendee may recover the amount 
paid upon the purchase price under the terms of 
an oral contract which does not satisfy the statute 
if the vendor is ready, able and willing to perform. 
Even where this minority view prevails, if there 
has been such part performance as will entitle 
the vendee, irrespective of a sufficient memoran-
dum, to enforce the contract against the vendor, 
he cannot recover back a part payment, if the 
vendor is ready and willing to perform. 
"If a contract for the sale of land is signed 
by the vendor and delivered to and accepted by 
the vendee although not signed by the latter, the 
contract is binding on the vendor and is therefore 
a sufficient consideration for payments made by 
the vendee, and he cannot, on the ground that the 
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contract was not signed by him, recover the. P~Y­
merrts so made if the vendor is able and wlllmg 
to perform." 
The same doctrine is announced in L.R.A. 1916 D, 
page 472 where there are also collected nu1nerous cases 
which support the text. 
On page 4 78 of L.R.A. 1916 D will be found a collec-
tion and discussion of the cases which support the 
minority view, from which it will be seen that there is 
considerable confusion among the cases even in the same 
jurisdiction, especially is that true in the State of Ala-
bama. The statement made in the above quoted text that 
the conflict in the authorities is in most of the jurisdic-
tions which hold that a recovery may not be had is based 
upon statutes merely declaring that no action should be 
brought upon oral contracts is not borne out by the cases, 
especially is that true of the cases in the \Yestern states 
where the statutes are identical, or substantially the 
same as the Statute of l-:-tah. A number of the cases are 
based upon the fact that the statute is, as the language 
thereof shows, for the protection of the seller of the land 
and not for the purchaser. \V e shall not discuss the 
cases which lend some color to the view that 1noney paid 
on an oral contract for the sale of land may be recovered 
back because we are not here concerned with an oral con-
tract, but with a written contract, which if and when :Mr. 
Merrill performs his obligations, is in all respects in 
conformity with the requirements of the Statute of 
F'rauds. 
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Of the numerous cases there cited, we direct the 
attention of the court to a few from our neighbors as 
typical of the cases generally. It will be noted that where 
payments have been made on a contract the same may 
not be recovered back by the one making the payment 
even though specific performance or damages will not 
be awarded where the vendor is ready, able and willing 
to perform his part of the contract. 
In the case of Toffery v. Ka,ufma.n, 134 Cal. 391, 66 
Pac. -J-71, 86 Am. St. Rep. (decided in 1901 by the Supreme 
Court of California), it is held that where $500.00 was 
paid down on an oral contract and the plaintiff sought 
to recover the same, he could not prevail where the 
defendant was ready, able and willing to convey the 
property upon payment of the amount remaining unpaid. 
In the course of the opinion (page 4 71 of Pacific Re-
porter) it is said: 
"This action is not one to enforce the specific 
performance of a parol contract for the sale of 
land, nor is it one in which a defense is based 
upon the statute of frauds. The plaintiff having 
made the contract, which is not unlawful, nor 
against public policy and having paid the money 
thereunder, cannot of his own volition and with-
out fault of defendants, come into court and 
receive the assistance thereof to recover the 
money voluntarily paid." 
On page 472 of the case, it is further said: 
"The right of the vendee of land under a 
verbal contract to recover the money or other 
consideration paid is by all the authorities con-
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fined to those cases where the vendor has refused 
or become unable to carry out the contract, the 
plaintiff himself having faithfully performed or 
offered to perform on his part." 
A number of cases are cited in the foregoing case 
to the same effect. 
In this case, Merrill contends that the time for mak-
ing the selection has passed. Just how he may be heard 
to complaint because of such fact is difficult to under-
stand where, as here, the Calders are ready, able and 
willing to perform their part of the contract, notwith-
standing the delay. 
Another well considered case decided by the Supreme 
Court of our neighboring state of Colorado is Gabarmo 
v. Union Sa.vings and Loan Assn., 107 Colo. 140; 109 
Pac. (2d) 638, 132 A.L.R. 1489. In that case the statute 
involved is almost identical with the statute relied upon 
by Merrill in this action. In that case the contract was 
oral. A check containing the words "Deposit on Detroit 
Apt., price $27,500, free and clear" was given as the 
initial payrnent. In an action brought to recover on the 
check, the court held that such an action could be main-
tained and the fa.ct that the same was given as a down 
payment for the purchase price of land was no defense. 
In that case the court cites a number of cases, including 
a few which the court indicated held to the contrary. 
However, as will be seen from the cases cited in the foot 
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note to 49 Am. Jur. 870, and L.R.A. 1916 D, page 472, 
the great weight of authority of the adjudicated cases 
and the text writers are in accord with the contention 
here being urged by the Calders, even if the contract is 
oral, which is not the fact in this case. 
It is submitted that the Motion to Strike the Counter-
claims should have been denied. The Calders pray that 
the errors complained of be corrected, that the case be 
remanded to the District Court with directions to that 
court to grant the change of venue prayed and that the 




Attorneys for Calders. 
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